Week+8


 * Distributed Cognition**


 * Pea (1993)**
 * on page 53, in the paragraph noting that "these tools literally carry intelligence //in// them", does Pea effectively describe a social-historical analogue to the process of reification/encapsulation (whereby the work (process) that went into substantiating calculus and the Cartesian Plane have in a sense become mathematical objects in the community)? (JLK)
 * Pea talks a lot about the impact of technologies (as tools) in education and in the world. What does the chapter seem to suggest, pertaining to the use of technological tools in a mathematics classroom? (JLK)
 * On page 48, Pea notes that distributed intelligence is not a theory of mind, culture, design, or symbol systems but is a heuristic framework for raising questions. What are the implications of designating something a theory versus a framework? (DOS, AJ)
 * The unit of analysis for distributed cognition seems to focus on a system of individuals and artifacts in the environment. What are the implications for research practices using distributed cognition? This seems like a departure for methods/analysis? What are the affordances/ limitations of this approach? Do research findings typically outweigh the limitations? (AJ)
 * In looking at trade-off 1 from page 57 is it reasonable to say that an algorithm is a tool, and that the last several decades has been this same struggle? The struggle between how much can we accomplish by teaching the tool versus teaching the conceptual underpinning? (JMG)


 * Solomon (1993)**
 * On page 121, the author quotes Dewey & Bentley, and mentions both "facts" and "Facts", then references William James' rejection of "absolutism". What do these considerations suggest in terms of distributed cognition with reference to epistemology (i.e. Ernest, 1996)? (JLK)
 * Solomon's third argument for including the individual's processes into distributed intelligence is that individuals' mental representations must be take into account. How can Solomon's argument be summarized in this section? (DOS)
 * This may be related to DOS question above -- How does one distinguish the knowledge of an individual from the shared knowledge of a system of individuals? (AJ)
 * Salomon talks a lot about cognitive residues in the individual that results from and influences activities involving distributed cognition. Is the idea of cognitive residues his conception of learning, or is there more involved? (JMG)
 * Can we think of DC tasks other than off-loading and shared activity? (JMG)


 * Cole & Engestrom (1993)**
 * The authors admit that their chapter might not actually push forward the thinking on distributed cognition. What, then, does this chapter accomplish, in consideration of learning theory? (JLK)
 * How many different forms of distributed cognition are mentioned in this chapter, and what are they? (JLK - I ask, because I don't know the answer).
 * The authors describe the distribution of the mind in time citing parents' statements about the implications of their child's gender (Can or can not play rugby). The authors cite this as an example of the parents distributing intelligence with their cultural past. How do they consider this an aspect of the cultural past and not of the cultural present? I am unclear on this section and the graph that follows on page 20. (DOS)


 * Views on Distributed Intelligence**
 * Pea || Salomon ||
 * A more prominent emphasis on the distributed nature of intelligence. || A more moderate view on intelligence being both distributed and internalized. ||
 * Uses a system as a unit of analysis || Allows for the use of the individual as a unit of analysis ||
 * Everything in your mind is shared with something else. || Allows for things that are entirely within the individual's mind. ||
 * "You collaborate with prior knowledge," it is shared with the situation in which you learned it and the people you learned it with. || "You own prior knowledge," it is cognitive residue. ||
 * Pea places an emphasis on the effects WITH tools. || Focuses on the effects OF tools. ||